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金正日死んで重村智計が生き返る
静岡県立大学の伊豆見元氏のことが大嫌いな「重村智計」を検索したらトップが
http://realtime.search.yahoo.co.jp/search?rkf=2&ei=UTF-8&p=%E9%87%8D%E6%9D%91%E6%99%BA%E8%A8%88
だった。
みんなのコメントが面白い(´･_･`)
早大の重村智計教授の著書によると、金正日には３人の影武者がいるらしい。みんな失業しちゃうのかな。
重村智計にも影武者がいて、そっちが好き勝手なコメントをしてるのかもしれんな
今日のニュースで流れた金正日死亡は、最後の影武者なのだろう〜。奴はとっくに死んでいる。と重村智計氏は思っているだろう。
テレンスリーと辺真一と藤本健二と重村智計つれてきて胡散臭さMAXな北朝鮮特番やってくれんかなー
そういや、重村智計ってどうしたんだ？
一昨日死亡した金正日（影武者二号）が本物死後、12年間も君臨してきたのは非常に優秀な人物だからだった。アメリカは当然把握、世界の常識だった。重村智計は真実を暴露してマスコミを追われた。統一教会と密接な関係の人物でCIA工作員だったとか
@hrtmnr じゃあ私は重村智計裸買い！
■参考資料
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=urzTweI2M4Y
2009年6月2日、重村氏は、次の後継者は金賢（キム・ヒョン）と断定。金正恩（キム ・ジョンウン）後継者報道はガセだそうな。
http://realtime.search.yahoo.co.jp/search?rkf=2&ei=UTF-8&p=%E9%87%8D%E6%9D%91%E6%99%BA%E8%A8%88
だった。
みんなのコメントが面白い(´･_･`)
早大の重村智計教授の著書によると、金正日には３人の影武者がいるらしい。みんな失業しちゃうのかな。
重村智計にも影武者がいて、そっちが好き勝手なコメントをしてるのかもしれんな
今日のニュースで流れた金正日死亡は、最後の影武者なのだろう〜。奴はとっくに死んでいる。と重村智計氏は思っているだろう。
テレンスリーと辺真一と藤本健二と重村智計つれてきて胡散臭さMAXな北朝鮮特番やってくれんかなー
そういや、重村智計ってどうしたんだ？
一昨日死亡した金正日（影武者二号）が本物死後、12年間も君臨してきたのは非常に優秀な人物だからだった。アメリカは当然把握、世界の常識だった。重村智計は真実を暴露してマスコミを追われた。統一教会と密接な関係の人物でCIA工作員だったとか
@hrtmnr じゃあ私は重村智計裸買い！
■参考資料
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=urzTweI2M4Y
2009年6月2日、重村氏は、次の後継者は金賢（キム・ヒョン）と断定。金正恩（キム ・ジョンウン）後継者報道はガセだそうな。
イケメン教授、ハーバード女史を叩く〜統計分析は政策科学たり得るか〜
International Security最新号より
Laurie Nathan (the U. of Pretoria) and Monica Duffy Toft (Harvard U.), “Correspondence: Civil War Settlements and the Prospects for Peace,” International Security 36:1 (Summer 2011), pp. 202-210.
Prof. Nathanがイケメンかどうかについては賛否両論があるでしょうが、彼のToft論文批判はとにかく面白いです。Toftは2010年に“Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory?” (34:4, pp. 7-36)という論文をISに寄稿しています。 この論文で彼女は、｢内戦が起きたら、国際社会は話し合い・交渉による解決を促すために政治的介入をすべきだ」という常識的見解を否定する統計的分析を鮮やかに披露します。その代替案は?
内戦が終わるまで勝手に戦わせておけ、です。そうすれば弱小勢力を壊滅させることができ、内戦終了後に民主化を果たすことが容易になります。風邪を引いたら解熱剤を飲まない方が早く治ります。せっかく敵対勢力というウイルスを壊滅させようとしているときに、国際社会が茶々を入れ解熱剤を投与すれば、風邪はいつまでたっても治りません。内戦（風邪）が再発する可能性も高まります。これは国際政治リベラリストに真っ向から対立する非常に面白い議論だと思います。
データ
“I began by combining the relevant information into a data set including all civil wars fought from 1940 to 2007. To be included in the data set, a civil war had to meet six criteria: (1) the focus of the war was control over which group would govern the political unit; (2) there were at least two groups of organized combatants; (3) one of the combatants was an internationally recognized state; (4) there were at least 1,000 battle deaths per year on average; (5) the ratio of total deaths had to be at least 95 percent to 5 percent, meaning the stronger side had to have suffered at least 5 percent of the casualties; and (6) the war had to have begun within the boundaries of an internationally recognized state. . . . The total number of wars that qualified for inclusion based on these criteria was 137. Of these, 118 experienced no violence for at least five years and are considered ended.” (2010: 12)
独立変数
type of civil war outcome (negotiated settlement, case-fire/stalemate, or victory)
“By 'negotiated settlement,' I mean an ideal-type war termination in which neither side admits defeat and the combatants agree to end the violence and accept common terms on how to govern a postwar state.”
“A 'cease-fire/stalemate' is similar to a negotiated settlement in that the parties agree to halt the violence. Unlike negotiated settlements, however, a cease-fire/stalemate does not attempt to achieve agreement on postwar power sharing. It simply ends the violence.”
“By 'victory,' I mean an ideal-type war termination in which one side explicitly acknowledges defeat and surrenders.” (2010: 11)
従属変数
war occurrence, democratization, economic prosperity...
統計的発見
“The data show that wars ending in victory were nearly twice as likely to remain settled than those concluded through negotiated settlement or a case-fire/stalemate. The recurrence of wars from 1940 to 2000 ending in military victories was 12 percent (10 of 81); 22 percent (5 of 23) in negotiated settlements; and 31 percent (4 of 13) in cease-fires/stalemates.
Thus, wars ended through negotiated settlement were twice as likely to reignite as those ending in victory. In addition, rebel victories were more stable than government victories. Therefore, not only does it matter that the war ended with a victory but also who achieved that victory. Whereas 17 percent of wars (8 of 48) ending in a government victory recurred (fewer than negotiated settlements and cease-fire/stalemates), only 6 percent of wars (2 of 33) won by rebels did so.” (2010: 16)
“The data presented in table 3 reveal that victory reduces the likelihood of civil war recurrence by 24 percent, relative to all other types of civil war termination. Conversely, negotiated settlements increase the chances of recurrence by 27 percent, relative to all other types. Both findings are statistically significant. As regards its substantive impact on war recurrence, war termination type is shown not only to be almost as important as a two standard deviation increase in the intensity of the violence, but also more important than issues of identity and territory, which have already received a good deal of attention and analysis in the literature. The statistical analysis thus confirms the hypothesis that civil wars ending in victory are less likely to recur than those ending with a negotiated settlement. Moreover, model 4 and 5 in table 3 show that rebel victory seems to be driving this relationship.” (2010: 17)
“Therefore, the results in table 3, 4, and 5 show not only that civil wars ending in negotiated settlements are more likely to begin anew and to last longer than wars ended by other means, but that the wars following these failed settlements are significantly more deadly. The five civil wars that ended with negotiated settlements but later reignited (Angola, Iraq, Lebanon, the Philippines, and Sudan) led, on average, to 0.015 total deaths per capita compared with 0.011 for all recurring civil wars; and an average of 0.005 battle deaths per capita compared to a mean of 0.003 for all recurrences. By both measures, recurring civil wars following negotiated settlements were roughly 50 percent more deadly. Thus, if war recurrence – with its corresponding increase in deaths, sacrifices in opportunity costs, destruction of infrastructure, and possible escalation of violence – represents a high cost, then negotiated settlements appear to be more costly than allowing the combatants to fight until one side emerges victorious. The empirical evidence, therefore, does not support the normative argument that negotiated settlements save lives.” (2010: 20)
“Overall, the statistical analyses reveal that the type of civil war settlement materially affects the prospects for enduring peace and democratization and, to a lesser extent, economic prosperity. In addition, they are able to track a settlement's impact over an extended period of time. The analyses produced three main findings. First, civil wars ending in negotiated settlements are much more likely to recur. Second, negotiated settlements are no more likely to lead to democracy than other types of settlements. Rather, rebel victories are more likely to produce this result. Third, economic growth trends do not seem to be correlated with the type of civil war termination.” (2010: 27)
要するに、内戦終結後のことを長いスパンで見れば、negotiated settlementを無理に進めるよりも、一方が勝つまで（政府軍よりも反乱軍が勝つ方が望ましいというようなことも言っています）戦わせたままにしておく方が、内乱による死傷者は減るし、民主化も進むというわけです。なぜそうなるかについてはToftはいろいろな仮説を出していますので論文を読んで確認してください。
Monica Duffy Toftの“Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory?”は、どこかの国で内戦が起きるたびに、誰もが満足できるような国内制度を樹立し、話し合いの解決を目指そうとするリベラリストに対して冷水を浴びせる非常に面白い論文なのですが、南アフリカ共和国のプレトリア大学紛争解決センター所長Laurie Nathanがこの論文の、とくにこの論文の統計的アプローチに対して痛烈に批判します。この批判がまた面白いです。
(to be continued)
Laurie Nathan (the U. of Pretoria) and Monica Duffy Toft (Harvard U.), “Correspondence: Civil War Settlements and the Prospects for Peace,” International Security 36:1 (Summer 2011), pp. 202-210.
Prof. Nathanがイケメンかどうかについては賛否両論があるでしょうが、彼のToft論文批判はとにかく面白いです。Toftは2010年に“Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory?” (34:4, pp. 7-36)という論文をISに寄稿しています。 この論文で彼女は、｢内戦が起きたら、国際社会は話し合い・交渉による解決を促すために政治的介入をすべきだ」という常識的見解を否定する統計的分析を鮮やかに披露します。その代替案は?
内戦が終わるまで勝手に戦わせておけ、です。そうすれば弱小勢力を壊滅させることができ、内戦終了後に民主化を果たすことが容易になります。風邪を引いたら解熱剤を飲まない方が早く治ります。せっかく敵対勢力というウイルスを壊滅させようとしているときに、国際社会が茶々を入れ解熱剤を投与すれば、風邪はいつまでたっても治りません。内戦（風邪）が再発する可能性も高まります。これは国際政治リベラリストに真っ向から対立する非常に面白い議論だと思います。
データ
“I began by combining the relevant information into a data set including all civil wars fought from 1940 to 2007. To be included in the data set, a civil war had to meet six criteria: (1) the focus of the war was control over which group would govern the political unit; (2) there were at least two groups of organized combatants; (3) one of the combatants was an internationally recognized state; (4) there were at least 1,000 battle deaths per year on average; (5) the ratio of total deaths had to be at least 95 percent to 5 percent, meaning the stronger side had to have suffered at least 5 percent of the casualties; and (6) the war had to have begun within the boundaries of an internationally recognized state. . . . The total number of wars that qualified for inclusion based on these criteria was 137. Of these, 118 experienced no violence for at least five years and are considered ended.” (2010: 12)
独立変数
type of civil war outcome (negotiated settlement, case-fire/stalemate, or victory)
“By 'negotiated settlement,' I mean an ideal-type war termination in which neither side admits defeat and the combatants agree to end the violence and accept common terms on how to govern a postwar state.”
“A 'cease-fire/stalemate' is similar to a negotiated settlement in that the parties agree to halt the violence. Unlike negotiated settlements, however, a cease-fire/stalemate does not attempt to achieve agreement on postwar power sharing. It simply ends the violence.”
“By 'victory,' I mean an ideal-type war termination in which one side explicitly acknowledges defeat and surrenders.” (2010: 11)
従属変数
war occurrence, democratization, economic prosperity...
統計的発見
“The data show that wars ending in victory were nearly twice as likely to remain settled than those concluded through negotiated settlement or a case-fire/stalemate. The recurrence of wars from 1940 to 2000 ending in military victories was 12 percent (10 of 81); 22 percent (5 of 23) in negotiated settlements; and 31 percent (4 of 13) in cease-fires/stalemates.
Thus, wars ended through negotiated settlement were twice as likely to reignite as those ending in victory. In addition, rebel victories were more stable than government victories. Therefore, not only does it matter that the war ended with a victory but also who achieved that victory. Whereas 17 percent of wars (8 of 48) ending in a government victory recurred (fewer than negotiated settlements and cease-fire/stalemates), only 6 percent of wars (2 of 33) won by rebels did so.” (2010: 16)
“The data presented in table 3 reveal that victory reduces the likelihood of civil war recurrence by 24 percent, relative to all other types of civil war termination. Conversely, negotiated settlements increase the chances of recurrence by 27 percent, relative to all other types. Both findings are statistically significant. As regards its substantive impact on war recurrence, war termination type is shown not only to be almost as important as a two standard deviation increase in the intensity of the violence, but also more important than issues of identity and territory, which have already received a good deal of attention and analysis in the literature. The statistical analysis thus confirms the hypothesis that civil wars ending in victory are less likely to recur than those ending with a negotiated settlement. Moreover, model 4 and 5 in table 3 show that rebel victory seems to be driving this relationship.” (2010: 17)
“Therefore, the results in table 3, 4, and 5 show not only that civil wars ending in negotiated settlements are more likely to begin anew and to last longer than wars ended by other means, but that the wars following these failed settlements are significantly more deadly. The five civil wars that ended with negotiated settlements but later reignited (Angola, Iraq, Lebanon, the Philippines, and Sudan) led, on average, to 0.015 total deaths per capita compared with 0.011 for all recurring civil wars; and an average of 0.005 battle deaths per capita compared to a mean of 0.003 for all recurrences. By both measures, recurring civil wars following negotiated settlements were roughly 50 percent more deadly. Thus, if war recurrence – with its corresponding increase in deaths, sacrifices in opportunity costs, destruction of infrastructure, and possible escalation of violence – represents a high cost, then negotiated settlements appear to be more costly than allowing the combatants to fight until one side emerges victorious. The empirical evidence, therefore, does not support the normative argument that negotiated settlements save lives.” (2010: 20)
“Overall, the statistical analyses reveal that the type of civil war settlement materially affects the prospects for enduring peace and democratization and, to a lesser extent, economic prosperity. In addition, they are able to track a settlement's impact over an extended period of time. The analyses produced three main findings. First, civil wars ending in negotiated settlements are much more likely to recur. Second, negotiated settlements are no more likely to lead to democracy than other types of settlements. Rather, rebel victories are more likely to produce this result. Third, economic growth trends do not seem to be correlated with the type of civil war termination.” (2010: 27)
要するに、内戦終結後のことを長いスパンで見れば、negotiated settlementを無理に進めるよりも、一方が勝つまで（政府軍よりも反乱軍が勝つ方が望ましいというようなことも言っています）戦わせたままにしておく方が、内乱による死傷者は減るし、民主化も進むというわけです。なぜそうなるかについてはToftはいろいろな仮説を出していますので論文を読んで確認してください。
Monica Duffy Toftの“Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory?”は、どこかの国で内戦が起きるたびに、誰もが満足できるような国内制度を樹立し、話し合いの解決を目指そうとするリベラリストに対して冷水を浴びせる非常に面白い論文なのですが、南アフリカ共和国のプレトリア大学紛争解決センター所長Laurie Nathanがこの論文の、とくにこの論文の統計的アプローチに対して痛烈に批判します。この批判がまた面白いです。
(to be continued)
外交史研究の評価基準―イラク新資料と核開発
International Security最新号より
Hal Brands (Duke U.) and David Palkki (PhD candidate at UCLA) , “Saddam, Israel, and the Bomb: Nuclear Alarmism Justified?” International Security, 36:1 (Summer 2011), pp. 133-166.
Brands先生のスペックはhttp://fds.duke.edu/db/Sanford/henry.brands参照
Målfrid Braut-Hegghammerの“Revisiting Osirak: Preventive Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation Proliferation Risks” と同様に、2003年のイラク戦争以降に出てきた新資料からサダム・フセインの核開発を分析した論文です。ただし、同じ資料を使っているのに結論が異なっています。Braut-Hegghammerは1981年以前のイラクの核開発は場当たり的で、イスラエルのオシラク核施設攻撃は不必要だったと議論していますが、この論文でBrandsとPalkkiは、サダム・フセインをイスラエルを中東の地図から消滅させるという｢目的｣の｢手段｣として核兵器配備を目指しており、それを阻止したオシラク核施設攻撃は極めて合理的な行動だったと主張しています。つまり、Nuclear alarmism is justifiedということです。
果たしてどちらの議論の方が正しいのでしょうか。私はBraut-Hegghammerの論文の方が分析のクオリティは高いと思います。でも、Brands&Palkkiの議論の方が正しいのかもしれません。社会科学系の論文の場合、explanatory power, generaliziability, parsimonyといったいくつかの基準で論文の善し悪しを評価しますが、外交史っぽい論文って何を基準にして内容の質を判断するのでしょうか。当然、descriptionが正しい方が論文の質は高いのでしょうが、何がcorrect descriptionかわからないのだから（わかるんだったら外交史は必要ないという逆説）、これを基準に論文の質を推し量ることはできないでしょう。
といったことを思いながら、論文を読み進めます。
著者はとくに1979年3月のミーティングに関する外交資料に注目します。
“The transcript of the March 1979 meeting is one of millions of Baathist state records captured during and after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. These records, many of which are now being made available to scholars, include everything from routine correspondence to recordings and transcripts of top-level meetings between Saddam and his advisers.” (pp. 133-134)
サダム・フセインが核開発を目指した理由。イスラエルを攻撃したいけど、イスラエルの核が怖い。こちら側も核をもったらイスラエルも「おいおい、おめえらおいらの核が怖くねえのか。なんかしやがったから核落とすからな!!」って脅せなくなって、通常戦争でおさまるから。
“On March 27, 1979, Saddam Hussein, the de facto ruler and soon-to-be president of Baathist Iraq, laid out his vision for a long, grinding war against Israel in a private meeting of high-level Iraqi officials. Iraq, he explained, would seek to obtain a nuclear weapon from 'our Soviet friends,' use the resulting deterrent power to counteract Israeli threats of nuclear retaliation, and thereby enable a 'patient war' – a war of attrition – that would reclaim Arab lands lost in the Six-Day War of 1967. As Saddam put it, nuclear weapons would allow Iraq to 'guarantee the long war that is destructive to our enemy, and take at our leisure each matter of land and drown the enemy with rivers of blood.' Saddam envisioned that this war would cost Iraq some 50,000 casualties, to say nothing of Israeli losses.” (p. 133)
“Although Saddam styled himself as the transcendent leader who would unite the Arabs and defeat the 'Zionist entity,' in private he concluded that Israel's nuclear monopoly in the Middle East made taking major military action to accomplish this goal an unacceptably risky proposition. In the face of an Iraqi or Arab attack, Saddam believed, Israel could simply threaten to use nuclear weapons against its enemies, thereby forcing them to halt their advance.
Saddam thus came to see nuclear weapons as a powerful coercive tool for dealing with Israel. Saddam's aim was not to launch a surprise first strike against Israel; rather, he believed that an Iraqi bomb would neutralize Israeli nuclear threats, force the Jewish state to fight at the conventional level, and thereby allow Iraq and its Arab allies to prosecute a prolonged war that would displace Israel from the territories occupied in 1967. In short, Saddam expected that an unconventional arsenal would permit Iraq to achieve a conventional victory, thereby weakening Israel geopolitically and making him a hero to the Arab world.” (pp. 134-135)
キーワードはstatus quo biasとstability-instability paradox。相互確証破壊は通常戦争を抑止しない、核レベルで安定すると、通常兵器レベルで不安定になるという議論。
“With respect to causes, Saddam's views on nuclear weapons demonstrate the need to go beyond what one scholar calls the 'status quo bias' in security studies. International relations scholars overwhelmingly emphasize the expectation that nuclear weapons will provide a primarily defensive deterrent against aggression or exploitation by a nuclear-armed rival. 'Although nuclear weapons could also be developed to serve either as deterrents against overwhelming conventional military threats or as coercive tools to compel changes in the status quo,' writes Scott Sagan in his landmark essay on this subject, 'the simple focus on states' responses to emerging nuclear threats is the most common and most parsimonious explanation for nuclear weapons proliferation.'
Saddam's views on nuclear weapons ran in a different direction. Although Saddam did believe that a nuclear capability would provide protection against attack by enemies such as Israel and Iran, the theme he returned to again and again – the idea that these weapons would enable the Arab states to achieve territorial gains vis-a-vis Israel – was essentially offensive and coercive in nature. Saddam certainly viewed an Iraqi bomb as a means of enhancing his country's security and prestige, but his attraction to nuclear weapons during the period under consideration in this article revolved around fundamentally revisionist objectives.” (pp. 135-136)
“Saddam's nuclear logic offers a clear example of how the dynamics of the stability-instability paradox can shape a leader's strategic thinking. We found no direct evidence that Saddam intended to use his prospective nuclear arsenal for a first strike against Israel or any other power, and he did hope that an Iraqi bomb would lead to the emergence of a deterrent balance with Israel. As the stability-instability paradox suggests, however, stability at the nuclear level would not necessarily have led to overall geopolitical stability. Saddam hoped to exploit the deterrent balance with Israel to initiate a conventional war that likely would have been immensely destructive and destabilizing. In other words, though Saddam never obtained nuclear weapons, his views on their potential utility give good cause for both pessimism and alarm.” (p. 137)
キーワードはproliferation optimists & proliferation pessimists。楽観主義の代表者はKenneth N. Waltz。proliferation pessimistsのBrandsとPalkkiは核拡散により核の均衡が生まれると戦争が増えると主張。
“These offensive motives, in turn, bear on the literature regarding the consequences of proliferation, in particular, the ongoing debate between 'proliferation optimists' and 'proliferation pessimists.' Whereas proliferation pessimists argue that the spread of nuclear weapons will increase the risk of accidential – or intentional – nuclear war, optimists answer that the spread of the bomb will promote the emergence of stable deterrent balances between geopolitical rivals. Because the threat of nuclear destruction will deter aggression, writes Kenneth Waltz in a recent article, 'Those who like peace should love nuclear weapons.' Similarly, at the time of the Persian Gulf crisis in 1990-91, Richard Rhodes argued that Iraqi acquisition of nuclear weapons would not be particularly dangerous because '45 years of postwar history has demonstrated that acquiring such weapons in a nuclear-armed world is incapably self-destructive.' More recently, proliferation optimists have been joined by scholars writing on the topic of 'nuclear alarmism.' These scholars argue (in part) that, because most states acquire nuclear weapons primarily to address perceived security weakness, when they get the bomb they will feel more secure and thus behave more prudently.
Drawing on the stability-instability paradox, we argue that the Iraqi case undermines these more sanguine assessments of proliferation and its consequences. The stability-instability paradox holds that nuclear proliferation makes general war less likely, but limited or proxy wars more likely. In a confrontation between two nuclear-armed states, both participants will have a major incentive to prevent any conflict from escalating to general war, for fear that this will result in the use of nuclear weapons. Yet because both states (presumably rational entities) are aware that their competitor seeks to avoid escalation, they may feel free to engage in aggression at lower levels of intensity, via limited war, terrorism, or proxy conflict.” (pp. 136-137)
“The foregoing analysis also bears on important theoretical debates over nuclear proliferation and its consequences. Saddam's views challenge the notion prevalent in much of the literature that the security-related concerns motivating states to seek nuclear weapons are necessarily defensive in nature. While Saddam hoped that acquiring the bomb would provide security from foreign attack, his desire for nuclear weapons was thoroughly wound up with his revisionist aims regarding Israel. Believing that his own destiny and that of the Arab world hinged on an offensive war to liberate the occupied territories, Saddam naturally viewed nuclear weapons through this prism. Because leaders' conceptualizations of nuclear strategy vary considerably, this case do not invalidate the argument that some or even most states seek nuclear weapons for primarily defensive reasons. It does indicate, however, that proliferation theorists need to consider more carefully the roles that offensive concerns play in pushing leaders to pursue the bomb.” (pp. 165-166)
ということで、イスラエルがオシラク核施設を空爆したのは正解だったと著者は主張します。
“While various observers have argued that the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 merely convinced Saddam of Israel's hostility and led him to redouble his efforts to obtain nuclear weapons, the captured records do not indicate that the opposite course – permitting Iraqi nuclear development to proceed – would have been the wider choice for Israeli officials at that time. Indeed, in these records Saddam makes the case for preventive Israeli action far more persuasively than Israel's own officials could have done at the time.” (p. 135)
“Scholars have criticized the Israeli attack on the Osirak reactor in 1981 for driving Iraqi nuclear development underground and causing Saddam to accelerate the program, but this critique loses much of its persuasiveness in light of the insights provided by the captured Iraqi records. As Saddam himself admitted, the Israelis were right to lose sleep over Iraq's technological development.” (p. 165)
“Saddam seems to have believed that Iraq would be ready to launch this war sometimes in the mid-1980s. In 1979, he told advisers that the battle would be 'not this year and not in the next five years,' a timeline that likely stemmed from the expectation that it would be several years before the Iraqi nuclear program reached fruition. Around the same time, Saddam boasted that if Israel or another enemy wished to strike Iraq, it would have to do so before 1985. After that, 'all of [Iraq's] enemies' would have to think twice about such an attack.” (p. 150)
イラクが核兵器の開発に成功したら、必ずイスラエルに通常兵器で攻撃をしかけたであろうと信じる著者(<-そんなのわかんねえよ!)。
“By dint of their larger geographical size and population, Saddam believed, the Arab states were better able to withstand nuclear attacks than was Israel. Israel would therefore have little choice but to keep the war at the conventional level.” (p. 149)
“Combined with other well-established features of Saddam's behavior – most notably his belief that he was destined to lead the Arab world and his tendency to use military power in pursuit of risky and aggressive ventures – his private comments on this subject were sufficient to persuade certain advisers that he was sincere in his desire for an eventual war against Israel.” (p. 152)
以下感想。アクターのバリエーションを考慮しないWaltzらのnuclear optimist的議論はたしかに眉唾的ですが、外交史家の方たちもなぜ資料を読んだだけで人の内面・思考がそんなにわかるのか（もしくはわかったつもりでいられるのか）不思議でたまりません。サダム・フセインが会議で、核を開発したらイスラエルに軍事攻撃をしかけると発言したという資料を見つけたとしても、その発言がどこまで本気なのかなんてわからないし、実際に核を配備したら、通常戦争が核戦争にエスカレートするのがこわくなって、通常戦争レベルでも抑止が成立するかもしれないじゃないですか(Robert JervisのThe Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution参照)。
ところで自称外交史家の方たちにBraut-Hegghammerと Brands/Palkkiの２つの論文を読んでもらって、�，匹舛蕕力席犬諒�が質が高いか、�▲ぅ好薀┘襪離�シラク核施設攻撃は成功だったかもしくは失敗だったか、尋ねてみたらどういう返答がかえってくるのだろうか。外交史分析の判断基準というものを知りたいものです。
Hal Brands (Duke U.) and David Palkki (PhD candidate at UCLA) , “Saddam, Israel, and the Bomb: Nuclear Alarmism Justified?” International Security, 36:1 (Summer 2011), pp. 133-166.
Brands先生のスペックはhttp://fds.duke.edu/db/Sanford/henry.brands参照
Målfrid Braut-Hegghammerの“Revisiting Osirak: Preventive Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation Proliferation Risks” と同様に、2003年のイラク戦争以降に出てきた新資料からサダム・フセインの核開発を分析した論文です。ただし、同じ資料を使っているのに結論が異なっています。Braut-Hegghammerは1981年以前のイラクの核開発は場当たり的で、イスラエルのオシラク核施設攻撃は不必要だったと議論していますが、この論文でBrandsとPalkkiは、サダム・フセインをイスラエルを中東の地図から消滅させるという｢目的｣の｢手段｣として核兵器配備を目指しており、それを阻止したオシラク核施設攻撃は極めて合理的な行動だったと主張しています。つまり、Nuclear alarmism is justifiedということです。
果たしてどちらの議論の方が正しいのでしょうか。私はBraut-Hegghammerの論文の方が分析のクオリティは高いと思います。でも、Brands&Palkkiの議論の方が正しいのかもしれません。社会科学系の論文の場合、explanatory power, generaliziability, parsimonyといったいくつかの基準で論文の善し悪しを評価しますが、外交史っぽい論文って何を基準にして内容の質を判断するのでしょうか。当然、descriptionが正しい方が論文の質は高いのでしょうが、何がcorrect descriptionかわからないのだから（わかるんだったら外交史は必要ないという逆説）、これを基準に論文の質を推し量ることはできないでしょう。
といったことを思いながら、論文を読み進めます。
著者はとくに1979年3月のミーティングに関する外交資料に注目します。
“The transcript of the March 1979 meeting is one of millions of Baathist state records captured during and after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. These records, many of which are now being made available to scholars, include everything from routine correspondence to recordings and transcripts of top-level meetings between Saddam and his advisers.” (pp. 133-134)
サダム・フセインが核開発を目指した理由。イスラエルを攻撃したいけど、イスラエルの核が怖い。こちら側も核をもったらイスラエルも「おいおい、おめえらおいらの核が怖くねえのか。なんかしやがったから核落とすからな!!」って脅せなくなって、通常戦争でおさまるから。
“On March 27, 1979, Saddam Hussein, the de facto ruler and soon-to-be president of Baathist Iraq, laid out his vision for a long, grinding war against Israel in a private meeting of high-level Iraqi officials. Iraq, he explained, would seek to obtain a nuclear weapon from 'our Soviet friends,' use the resulting deterrent power to counteract Israeli threats of nuclear retaliation, and thereby enable a 'patient war' – a war of attrition – that would reclaim Arab lands lost in the Six-Day War of 1967. As Saddam put it, nuclear weapons would allow Iraq to 'guarantee the long war that is destructive to our enemy, and take at our leisure each matter of land and drown the enemy with rivers of blood.' Saddam envisioned that this war would cost Iraq some 50,000 casualties, to say nothing of Israeli losses.” (p. 133)
“Although Saddam styled himself as the transcendent leader who would unite the Arabs and defeat the 'Zionist entity,' in private he concluded that Israel's nuclear monopoly in the Middle East made taking major military action to accomplish this goal an unacceptably risky proposition. In the face of an Iraqi or Arab attack, Saddam believed, Israel could simply threaten to use nuclear weapons against its enemies, thereby forcing them to halt their advance.
Saddam thus came to see nuclear weapons as a powerful coercive tool for dealing with Israel. Saddam's aim was not to launch a surprise first strike against Israel; rather, he believed that an Iraqi bomb would neutralize Israeli nuclear threats, force the Jewish state to fight at the conventional level, and thereby allow Iraq and its Arab allies to prosecute a prolonged war that would displace Israel from the territories occupied in 1967. In short, Saddam expected that an unconventional arsenal would permit Iraq to achieve a conventional victory, thereby weakening Israel geopolitically and making him a hero to the Arab world.” (pp. 134-135)
キーワードはstatus quo biasとstability-instability paradox。相互確証破壊は通常戦争を抑止しない、核レベルで安定すると、通常兵器レベルで不安定になるという議論。
“With respect to causes, Saddam's views on nuclear weapons demonstrate the need to go beyond what one scholar calls the 'status quo bias' in security studies. International relations scholars overwhelmingly emphasize the expectation that nuclear weapons will provide a primarily defensive deterrent against aggression or exploitation by a nuclear-armed rival. 'Although nuclear weapons could also be developed to serve either as deterrents against overwhelming conventional military threats or as coercive tools to compel changes in the status quo,' writes Scott Sagan in his landmark essay on this subject, 'the simple focus on states' responses to emerging nuclear threats is the most common and most parsimonious explanation for nuclear weapons proliferation.'
Saddam's views on nuclear weapons ran in a different direction. Although Saddam did believe that a nuclear capability would provide protection against attack by enemies such as Israel and Iran, the theme he returned to again and again – the idea that these weapons would enable the Arab states to achieve territorial gains vis-a-vis Israel – was essentially offensive and coercive in nature. Saddam certainly viewed an Iraqi bomb as a means of enhancing his country's security and prestige, but his attraction to nuclear weapons during the period under consideration in this article revolved around fundamentally revisionist objectives.” (pp. 135-136)
“Saddam's nuclear logic offers a clear example of how the dynamics of the stability-instability paradox can shape a leader's strategic thinking. We found no direct evidence that Saddam intended to use his prospective nuclear arsenal for a first strike against Israel or any other power, and he did hope that an Iraqi bomb would lead to the emergence of a deterrent balance with Israel. As the stability-instability paradox suggests, however, stability at the nuclear level would not necessarily have led to overall geopolitical stability. Saddam hoped to exploit the deterrent balance with Israel to initiate a conventional war that likely would have been immensely destructive and destabilizing. In other words, though Saddam never obtained nuclear weapons, his views on their potential utility give good cause for both pessimism and alarm.” (p. 137)
キーワードはproliferation optimists & proliferation pessimists。楽観主義の代表者はKenneth N. Waltz。proliferation pessimistsのBrandsとPalkkiは核拡散により核の均衡が生まれると戦争が増えると主張。
“These offensive motives, in turn, bear on the literature regarding the consequences of proliferation, in particular, the ongoing debate between 'proliferation optimists' and 'proliferation pessimists.' Whereas proliferation pessimists argue that the spread of nuclear weapons will increase the risk of accidential – or intentional – nuclear war, optimists answer that the spread of the bomb will promote the emergence of stable deterrent balances between geopolitical rivals. Because the threat of nuclear destruction will deter aggression, writes Kenneth Waltz in a recent article, 'Those who like peace should love nuclear weapons.' Similarly, at the time of the Persian Gulf crisis in 1990-91, Richard Rhodes argued that Iraqi acquisition of nuclear weapons would not be particularly dangerous because '45 years of postwar history has demonstrated that acquiring such weapons in a nuclear-armed world is incapably self-destructive.' More recently, proliferation optimists have been joined by scholars writing on the topic of 'nuclear alarmism.' These scholars argue (in part) that, because most states acquire nuclear weapons primarily to address perceived security weakness, when they get the bomb they will feel more secure and thus behave more prudently.
Drawing on the stability-instability paradox, we argue that the Iraqi case undermines these more sanguine assessments of proliferation and its consequences. The stability-instability paradox holds that nuclear proliferation makes general war less likely, but limited or proxy wars more likely. In a confrontation between two nuclear-armed states, both participants will have a major incentive to prevent any conflict from escalating to general war, for fear that this will result in the use of nuclear weapons. Yet because both states (presumably rational entities) are aware that their competitor seeks to avoid escalation, they may feel free to engage in aggression at lower levels of intensity, via limited war, terrorism, or proxy conflict.” (pp. 136-137)
“The foregoing analysis also bears on important theoretical debates over nuclear proliferation and its consequences. Saddam's views challenge the notion prevalent in much of the literature that the security-related concerns motivating states to seek nuclear weapons are necessarily defensive in nature. While Saddam hoped that acquiring the bomb would provide security from foreign attack, his desire for nuclear weapons was thoroughly wound up with his revisionist aims regarding Israel. Believing that his own destiny and that of the Arab world hinged on an offensive war to liberate the occupied territories, Saddam naturally viewed nuclear weapons through this prism. Because leaders' conceptualizations of nuclear strategy vary considerably, this case do not invalidate the argument that some or even most states seek nuclear weapons for primarily defensive reasons. It does indicate, however, that proliferation theorists need to consider more carefully the roles that offensive concerns play in pushing leaders to pursue the bomb.” (pp. 165-166)
ということで、イスラエルがオシラク核施設を空爆したのは正解だったと著者は主張します。
“While various observers have argued that the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 merely convinced Saddam of Israel's hostility and led him to redouble his efforts to obtain nuclear weapons, the captured records do not indicate that the opposite course – permitting Iraqi nuclear development to proceed – would have been the wider choice for Israeli officials at that time. Indeed, in these records Saddam makes the case for preventive Israeli action far more persuasively than Israel's own officials could have done at the time.” (p. 135)
“Scholars have criticized the Israeli attack on the Osirak reactor in 1981 for driving Iraqi nuclear development underground and causing Saddam to accelerate the program, but this critique loses much of its persuasiveness in light of the insights provided by the captured Iraqi records. As Saddam himself admitted, the Israelis were right to lose sleep over Iraq's technological development.” (p. 165)
“Saddam seems to have believed that Iraq would be ready to launch this war sometimes in the mid-1980s. In 1979, he told advisers that the battle would be 'not this year and not in the next five years,' a timeline that likely stemmed from the expectation that it would be several years before the Iraqi nuclear program reached fruition. Around the same time, Saddam boasted that if Israel or another enemy wished to strike Iraq, it would have to do so before 1985. After that, 'all of [Iraq's] enemies' would have to think twice about such an attack.” (p. 150)
イラクが核兵器の開発に成功したら、必ずイスラエルに通常兵器で攻撃をしかけたであろうと信じる著者(<-そんなのわかんねえよ!)。
“By dint of their larger geographical size and population, Saddam believed, the Arab states were better able to withstand nuclear attacks than was Israel. Israel would therefore have little choice but to keep the war at the conventional level.” (p. 149)
“Combined with other well-established features of Saddam's behavior – most notably his belief that he was destined to lead the Arab world and his tendency to use military power in pursuit of risky and aggressive ventures – his private comments on this subject were sufficient to persuade certain advisers that he was sincere in his desire for an eventual war against Israel.” (p. 152)
以下感想。アクターのバリエーションを考慮しないWaltzらのnuclear optimist的議論はたしかに眉唾的ですが、外交史家の方たちもなぜ資料を読んだだけで人の内面・思考がそんなにわかるのか（もしくはわかったつもりでいられるのか）不思議でたまりません。サダム・フセインが会議で、核を開発したらイスラエルに軍事攻撃をしかけると発言したという資料を見つけたとしても、その発言がどこまで本気なのかなんてわからないし、実際に核を配備したら、通常戦争が核戦争にエスカレートするのがこわくなって、通常戦争レベルでも抑止が成立するかもしれないじゃないですか(Robert JervisのThe Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution参照)。
ところで自称外交史家の方たちにBraut-Hegghammerと Brands/Palkkiの２つの論文を読んでもらって、�，匹舛蕕力席犬諒�が質が高いか、�▲ぅ好薀┘襪離�シラク核施設攻撃は成功だったかもしくは失敗だったか、尋ねてみたらどういう返答がかえってくるのだろうか。外交史分析の判断基準というものを知りたいものです。
「日常生活の危険信号」チェックリスト
社畜NEWS404に「過労死リスクが高くなる10の行動」という記事があったので自分も点検してみました。
http://shachik.blogspot.com/2011/09/blog-post_13.html
「日常生活の危険信号」チェックリスト
（１）喫煙習慣がある
なし
（２）ほぼ毎日ビール３本以上飲んでいる（日本酒なら３合、焼酎水割りで４杯）
居酒屋に行っても、生ビール1杯と芋焼酎2杯でストップ。それ以上飲めません。
（３）接待や付き合いの酒が週３回以上ある
年に1回はある（元税理士事務所職員の友人に申告書をタダで書いてもらうため）
（４）朝食抜きで出勤することがほとんど
朝食は食べません。
（５）食事内容が肉類中心に偏っている
学食でも必ず定食を注文。とくに肉好きではない。
（６）毎日帰宅はほぼ２３時過ぎになる
帰宅時間は7時半頃
（７）１日の睡眠時間は５時間以下
毎日7時間以上寝ないと生きていけません。中国人ではないけどお昼寝もします。｢横浜日記｣の先生みたいな生活をし続けたら、私だったら確実に3日でダウン。
（８）通勤が片道２時間以上かかる
歩いて10分。早く着きすぎるのでぶらっと回り道をして仕事場には行きます。自宅が変わるので来年からはチャリで10分。
（９）運動習慣がまったくない
散歩とチャリが趣味。毎日最低1時間は歩いているかチャリに乗っている。以前木更津で学会があったときは、つまんなくて途中退席。歩いて山を下りて駅周辺のバス停まで行きました（たしか4時間くらいかかった）。仕事場に大型TVを置いてキネクトをしてます。Your Shape Fitness Evolvedは飽きてきたので、Dance Evolutionをはじめる予定。
（10）健康なので医者にかかったことはないし、会社の健診もしばらく受けていない
なんでどこも悪くないのに、わざわざ放射線を浴びに検診に行かないといけないのですか。
３つ以上該当するようなら過労死のリスクが高くなる
＊過労死・自死相談センター代表／上畑鉄之丞医師作成
(4)朝食を食べない、と(10)医者にかからない、検診に行かない、の2つに該当ですね。この2つが原因で過労死するわけないと思うのだが(-__-)
http://shachik.blogspot.com/2011/09/blog-post_13.html
「日常生活の危険信号」チェックリスト
（１）喫煙習慣がある
なし
（２）ほぼ毎日ビール３本以上飲んでいる（日本酒なら３合、焼酎水割りで４杯）
居酒屋に行っても、生ビール1杯と芋焼酎2杯でストップ。それ以上飲めません。
（３）接待や付き合いの酒が週３回以上ある
年に1回はある（元税理士事務所職員の友人に申告書をタダで書いてもらうため）
（４）朝食抜きで出勤することがほとんど
朝食は食べません。
（５）食事内容が肉類中心に偏っている
学食でも必ず定食を注文。とくに肉好きではない。
（６）毎日帰宅はほぼ２３時過ぎになる
帰宅時間は7時半頃
（７）１日の睡眠時間は５時間以下
毎日7時間以上寝ないと生きていけません。中国人ではないけどお昼寝もします。｢横浜日記｣の先生みたいな生活をし続けたら、私だったら確実に3日でダウン。
（８）通勤が片道２時間以上かかる
歩いて10分。早く着きすぎるのでぶらっと回り道をして仕事場には行きます。自宅が変わるので来年からはチャリで10分。
（９）運動習慣がまったくない
散歩とチャリが趣味。毎日最低1時間は歩いているかチャリに乗っている。以前木更津で学会があったときは、つまんなくて途中退席。歩いて山を下りて駅周辺のバス停まで行きました（たしか4時間くらいかかった）。仕事場に大型TVを置いてキネクトをしてます。Your Shape Fitness Evolvedは飽きてきたので、Dance Evolutionをはじめる予定。
（10）健康なので医者にかかったことはないし、会社の健診もしばらく受けていない
なんでどこも悪くないのに、わざわざ放射線を浴びに検診に行かないといけないのですか。
３つ以上該当するようなら過労死のリスクが高くなる
＊過労死・自死相談センター代表／上畑鉄之丞医師作成
(4)朝食を食べない、と(10)医者にかからない、検診に行かない、の2つに該当ですね。この2つが原因で過労死するわけないと思うのだが(-__-)
予防的先制攻撃の危険性―イスラエルのイラク・オシラク核施設攻撃の事例から
International Security最新号より
Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer (the Institute for Defence Studies at the Norwegian Defence University College), “Revisiting Osirak: Preventive Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation Proliferation Risks,” International Security 36:1 (Summer 2011), pp. 101-132.
1981年6月7日、イスラエルの空軍基地から飛び立った8機のF16戦闘機と6機のF15戦闘機は、ヨルダン・サウジアラビアを経由してイラクに侵入し、F16がオシラク原子炉を空爆。投下された爆弾16発のうち14発が原子炉を直撃し、イラクの核開発は一時頓挫します。戦闘機は全機無事帰還。軍事「戦術」的には100%の成功を収めたこのpreventive attackは｢戦略｣的にも成功だったのか、というのがこの論文のパズルです。軍事的脅威の強度は「能力｣と｢意思｣の関数とよく言われますが、軍事攻撃で敵対国の核開発能力を一時的に弱めることができたとしても、それにより核開発の｢意思｣がさらに強靱になり核開発のスピードが早まれば、そのpreventive attackは戦略的には失敗したということになります。
果たして、オシラク攻撃により、イラクの核開発は早まったのか、それともそれを遅らせることに貢献したのか。1991年の湾岸戦争直前には、イラクは核開発一歩手前であったことが、戦争終了後のIAEA核査察で明らかになりましたが、それはpreventive attackが無意味だったことの証明なのか、それともクウェート侵略前にイラクが核配備を実施するのを阻んだ成功事例と見なすべきなのか。「もしもあのときにイスラエルがイラクの原子炉を破壊しなかったならば｣というcounterfactual thought experimentをふくむ、この難しい問いかけに対し、著者は2003年以降に次々に出てきたイラク資料を詳細に分析し、このオシラク攻撃は軍事戦略的には失敗であったと結論づけます。1981年当時はフセインも核開発を最重要視しておらず、綿密なプランの下に核開発を進めていなかったにも関わらず、フセインはsurprise attackに激怒し、核開発を秘密裏におこなう決定、そして核関連組織の一新を図ることになったからです。なかなか面白い論文でした。
イスラエルのオシラク核施設攻撃は成功だったのか。
“The academic debate on the consequences of the Osirak attack for Iraq's nuclear weapons program remains polarized. Supporters of the attack argue that the strike prevented the development of an Iraqi nuclear weapons capability. Critics argue that the strike accelerated Iraq's nuclear efforts, pointing to the establishment of a clandestine weapons program in the fall of 1981. Both sides of the debate apply lessons from Osirak for predicting the consequences of similar attacks on Iranian or North Korean nuclear facilities.” (p.102)
1981年当時―イラクの核開発は実はあまり進んでいなかった
“In sum, on the eve of the attack on Osirak, Iraq was in the process of establishing a technological base that could facilitate developing the building blocks for a nuclear weapons program (e.g., fuel experiments). To produce sufficient plutonium for several nuclear weapons, Iraq would need larger facilities that were not subject to external oversight and safeguards. The political momentum driving Iraq's efforts to develop a weapons option appears to have been inconsistent at best. Saddam had not secured the basic organizational resources or budgets. As a result, Iraq's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability was both directionless and disorganized.” (p.110)
1981年以降―イスラエルの行為に怒ったフセインが核開発を急ピッチ化
“Israel destroyed the Osirak reactor as it stood on the verge of becoming operational. The Israeli government cited self-defense, claiming that the reactor was 'designed to produce atomic bombs.' Following the destruction of the reactor, Iraq established a covert nuclear weapons program. This program can be divided into three distinct phases: a research program (1981-87), and operational program (1987-90), and a crash program (1990-91). The research program was hampered by the arduous technological routes taken and suboptimal management, resulting in years of delay. As a consequence, in 1987 the Iraqis decided to restructure the program. From 1987 to 1990, the Iraqis made substantial advances toward establishing a weapons capability. Finally, following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, a crash program was launched to attempt to rapidly assemble a nuclear weapon by diverting safeguarded reactor fuel.” (pp.115-6)
著者の結論
“I argue that the Israeli attack had mixed effects: it triggered a nuclear weapons program where one did not previously exist, while forcing Iraq to pursue a more difficult and time-consuming technological route. Despite these challenges and added delays resulting from inefficient management, within a decade Iraq stood on the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability. Ultimately, I conclude that the Israeli attack was counterproductive.” (p.102)
"A net assessment suggests that the attack was ultimately counterproductive, triggering the establishment of a covert program that was not detected by the outside world before it was interrupted by the 1991 Gulf War.” (p.131)
“The issue of resources is pertinent for comparing Iraq's nuclear weapons options in 1981 and 1991. It is clear that the Israeli attack effectively deprived Baghdad of pursuing the plutonium route to develop a nuclear weapons capability. It is theoretically possible that Iraq could have developed nuclear weapons by the mid-to-late 1980s if Israel had not attacked Osirak. Still, the Iraqis lacked the organizational, financial, and organizational resources to implement the 1980 proliferation decision. There were no signs in 1980-81 that Baghdad was taking meaningful steps toward an operational program. Saddam's failure to act on his proliferation decision in the year that passed between making this decision and the Israeli attack suggests that an operational nuclear weapons program was simply not a high priority. In 1980 the Iraqi leadership faced domestic security challenges and, from late September, a war with Iran that detracted Saddam's attention from the nuclear program. Once the Iraqi leader had made this decision, dysfunctional management would most likely have slowed the program's progress, as it did in the enrichment program following the Israeli strike.” (pp. 128-9)
予防的先制攻撃の危険性
“The case of Osirak suggests that preventive attacks can have negative effects on nuclear proliferation risks in the long run for at least two reasons. First, such attacks can solidify or create an unprecedented consensus among ruling elites about the need for a nuclear deterrent. This consensus can, for example, trigger decisions to provide nuclear establishments with a mandate to develop nuclear weapons or lead to the creation of a dedicated organization or an increased budget. Such decisions can have dramatic short-term effects (such as the establishment of a nuclear weapons program or the dedication of additional resources to a preexisting program), but the consequences can also be long-lasting. Providing for rapidly expanding budgets and organizations can create self-reinforcing dynamics and bring about independent momentum because of vested bureaucratic and individual interests. Second, such attacks may create a false sense of security, making the international community oblivious to a rapidly intensifying proliferation risk. The mixed consequences that can result from such attacks in terms of technical capacity and political will make it difficult to predict their longer-term effects. In other words, even though such attacks can buy time by necessitating more time-consuming technical approaches, they can have serious counterproductive consequences. In the long term, such effects can make the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the targeted state a more likely outcome.” (pp.130-1)
でも単一事例を軽々しくgeneralizeしちゃダメよ、というお話。
“Other studies have implicitly or explicitly posited Osirak as a critical case for assessing the likely impact of preventive attacks on other states, but such conclusions can be misleading. First, because these analyses have not captured the mixed impact the attack had, or the extent to which it transformed the Iraqi program, they may have identified the wrong lessons. Second, the idiosyncratic character of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program suggests that it is perhaps difficult to extrapolate direct lessons from this case for analyzing how preventive attacks elsewhere may influence proliferation risks. The pace of the Iraqi program from 1981 to 1991 was influenced by peculiar organizational dynamics and decisionmaking characteristics that may not be present in other states and different political systems. Further, other states may not be required to develop an alternative technological basis for a nuclear weapons program in the wake of an attack, as was the case in Iraq. There is, of course, a substantial difference between reconstructing a damaged infrastructure for the purposes of a nuclear weapons program and developing an alternative basis for such a program.” (pp. 129-130)
Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer (the Institute for Defence Studies at the Norwegian Defence University College), “Revisiting Osirak: Preventive Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation Proliferation Risks,” International Security 36:1 (Summer 2011), pp. 101-132.
1981年6月7日、イスラエルの空軍基地から飛び立った8機のF16戦闘機と6機のF15戦闘機は、ヨルダン・サウジアラビアを経由してイラクに侵入し、F16がオシラク原子炉を空爆。投下された爆弾16発のうち14発が原子炉を直撃し、イラクの核開発は一時頓挫します。戦闘機は全機無事帰還。軍事「戦術」的には100%の成功を収めたこのpreventive attackは｢戦略｣的にも成功だったのか、というのがこの論文のパズルです。軍事的脅威の強度は「能力｣と｢意思｣の関数とよく言われますが、軍事攻撃で敵対国の核開発能力を一時的に弱めることができたとしても、それにより核開発の｢意思｣がさらに強靱になり核開発のスピードが早まれば、そのpreventive attackは戦略的には失敗したということになります。
果たして、オシラク攻撃により、イラクの核開発は早まったのか、それともそれを遅らせることに貢献したのか。1991年の湾岸戦争直前には、イラクは核開発一歩手前であったことが、戦争終了後のIAEA核査察で明らかになりましたが、それはpreventive attackが無意味だったことの証明なのか、それともクウェート侵略前にイラクが核配備を実施するのを阻んだ成功事例と見なすべきなのか。「もしもあのときにイスラエルがイラクの原子炉を破壊しなかったならば｣というcounterfactual thought experimentをふくむ、この難しい問いかけに対し、著者は2003年以降に次々に出てきたイラク資料を詳細に分析し、このオシラク攻撃は軍事戦略的には失敗であったと結論づけます。1981年当時はフセインも核開発を最重要視しておらず、綿密なプランの下に核開発を進めていなかったにも関わらず、フセインはsurprise attackに激怒し、核開発を秘密裏におこなう決定、そして核関連組織の一新を図ることになったからです。なかなか面白い論文でした。
イスラエルのオシラク核施設攻撃は成功だったのか。
“The academic debate on the consequences of the Osirak attack for Iraq's nuclear weapons program remains polarized. Supporters of the attack argue that the strike prevented the development of an Iraqi nuclear weapons capability. Critics argue that the strike accelerated Iraq's nuclear efforts, pointing to the establishment of a clandestine weapons program in the fall of 1981. Both sides of the debate apply lessons from Osirak for predicting the consequences of similar attacks on Iranian or North Korean nuclear facilities.” (p.102)
1981年当時―イラクの核開発は実はあまり進んでいなかった
“In sum, on the eve of the attack on Osirak, Iraq was in the process of establishing a technological base that could facilitate developing the building blocks for a nuclear weapons program (e.g., fuel experiments). To produce sufficient plutonium for several nuclear weapons, Iraq would need larger facilities that were not subject to external oversight and safeguards. The political momentum driving Iraq's efforts to develop a weapons option appears to have been inconsistent at best. Saddam had not secured the basic organizational resources or budgets. As a result, Iraq's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability was both directionless and disorganized.” (p.110)
1981年以降―イスラエルの行為に怒ったフセインが核開発を急ピッチ化
“Israel destroyed the Osirak reactor as it stood on the verge of becoming operational. The Israeli government cited self-defense, claiming that the reactor was 'designed to produce atomic bombs.' Following the destruction of the reactor, Iraq established a covert nuclear weapons program. This program can be divided into three distinct phases: a research program (1981-87), and operational program (1987-90), and a crash program (1990-91). The research program was hampered by the arduous technological routes taken and suboptimal management, resulting in years of delay. As a consequence, in 1987 the Iraqis decided to restructure the program. From 1987 to 1990, the Iraqis made substantial advances toward establishing a weapons capability. Finally, following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, a crash program was launched to attempt to rapidly assemble a nuclear weapon by diverting safeguarded reactor fuel.” (pp.115-6)
著者の結論
“I argue that the Israeli attack had mixed effects: it triggered a nuclear weapons program where one did not previously exist, while forcing Iraq to pursue a more difficult and time-consuming technological route. Despite these challenges and added delays resulting from inefficient management, within a decade Iraq stood on the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability. Ultimately, I conclude that the Israeli attack was counterproductive.” (p.102)
"A net assessment suggests that the attack was ultimately counterproductive, triggering the establishment of a covert program that was not detected by the outside world before it was interrupted by the 1991 Gulf War.” (p.131)
“The issue of resources is pertinent for comparing Iraq's nuclear weapons options in 1981 and 1991. It is clear that the Israeli attack effectively deprived Baghdad of pursuing the plutonium route to develop a nuclear weapons capability. It is theoretically possible that Iraq could have developed nuclear weapons by the mid-to-late 1980s if Israel had not attacked Osirak. Still, the Iraqis lacked the organizational, financial, and organizational resources to implement the 1980 proliferation decision. There were no signs in 1980-81 that Baghdad was taking meaningful steps toward an operational program. Saddam's failure to act on his proliferation decision in the year that passed between making this decision and the Israeli attack suggests that an operational nuclear weapons program was simply not a high priority. In 1980 the Iraqi leadership faced domestic security challenges and, from late September, a war with Iran that detracted Saddam's attention from the nuclear program. Once the Iraqi leader had made this decision, dysfunctional management would most likely have slowed the program's progress, as it did in the enrichment program following the Israeli strike.” (pp. 128-9)
予防的先制攻撃の危険性
“The case of Osirak suggests that preventive attacks can have negative effects on nuclear proliferation risks in the long run for at least two reasons. First, such attacks can solidify or create an unprecedented consensus among ruling elites about the need for a nuclear deterrent. This consensus can, for example, trigger decisions to provide nuclear establishments with a mandate to develop nuclear weapons or lead to the creation of a dedicated organization or an increased budget. Such decisions can have dramatic short-term effects (such as the establishment of a nuclear weapons program or the dedication of additional resources to a preexisting program), but the consequences can also be long-lasting. Providing for rapidly expanding budgets and organizations can create self-reinforcing dynamics and bring about independent momentum because of vested bureaucratic and individual interests. Second, such attacks may create a false sense of security, making the international community oblivious to a rapidly intensifying proliferation risk. The mixed consequences that can result from such attacks in terms of technical capacity and political will make it difficult to predict their longer-term effects. In other words, even though such attacks can buy time by necessitating more time-consuming technical approaches, they can have serious counterproductive consequences. In the long term, such effects can make the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the targeted state a more likely outcome.” (pp.130-1)
でも単一事例を軽々しくgeneralizeしちゃダメよ、というお話。
“Other studies have implicitly or explicitly posited Osirak as a critical case for assessing the likely impact of preventive attacks on other states, but such conclusions can be misleading. First, because these analyses have not captured the mixed impact the attack had, or the extent to which it transformed the Iraqi program, they may have identified the wrong lessons. Second, the idiosyncratic character of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program suggests that it is perhaps difficult to extrapolate direct lessons from this case for analyzing how preventive attacks elsewhere may influence proliferation risks. The pace of the Iraqi program from 1981 to 1991 was influenced by peculiar organizational dynamics and decisionmaking characteristics that may not be present in other states and different political systems. Further, other states may not be required to develop an alternative technological basis for a nuclear weapons program in the wake of an attack, as was the case in Iraq. There is, of course, a substantial difference between reconstructing a damaged infrastructure for the purposes of a nuclear weapons program and developing an alternative basis for such a program.” (pp. 129-130)
なぜ戦争は起こるのか―｢戦争のルビコン理論｣
International Security最新号より
Dominic D.P. Johnson (U. of Edinburgh) and Dominic Tierney (Swarthmore College), “The Rubicon Theory of War: How the Path to Conflict Reaches the Point of No Return,” International Security, 36:1 (Summer 2011), pp. 7-40.
International Security最新号の巻頭論文です。タダで読むことができるので興味のある方は次をクリック★ http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00043
なぜ戦争は起こるの? 子供にこう尋ねられて、うまく返答できる国際政治学者は実はそんなにはいないと思います。平和な世界のdefault positionが異なるからです。子供にとっての初期状態は他人に迷惑をかけない善人ばかりいる世界です。その初期状態を変えるのは悪い人たちです。自分の得のために平気で他人を不幸に陥れる人がいるから戦争は起きるに違いないと子どもたちは考え、そういう人が世の中にはいるのが信じられないから戦争が起きるのが不思議でしょうがなくなるわけです。ニンテンドー3DSを買ってもらっただけでこの世の至福を味わえる子どもたちには、ゲーム機を得るために人を殺すなんて本当に信じられないことなのです。だから子どもたちには、世の中には自分のことしか考えないとっても悪い人がいるってことを教えてあげたうえで、そういう一部の邪悪な人間がどんな得を得ようとして戦争を起こすのか説明しないといけません（http://www.systemicsarchive.com/ja/c/war.html参照。その一昔前のマルクス主義的議論がけっこう笑えます）。
国際政治学者にとってのdefault positionはindividual rationalityです。戦争を起こすことで得をする人がいるから戦争が起きる、という発想を（主流の）国際政治学者はしません。得をするためには戦争に勝たないといけませんが、政策決定者が合理的であったら、負ける側は戦争に訴えずに最初から相手側の要求を受け入れた方が得なはずです。だったら実際に武力が行使される前に交渉・バーゲニングで双方の対立は解決されるわけです。政策決定者が完全合理性を有していたら戦争は起きないというのが国際政治学における初期状態であり、その初期状態を壊すものを見いだすことで彼らは戦争の原因が何か発見しようとします（もちろん、違った観点から戦争原因を探る研究は多々ありますが、戦争を原初状態と見なすよりも、戦争のない世界を常態と見なした方がなにかとわかりやすくなると思います）。
合理主義者はこの問題に対して｢合理性の非合理性｣を見いだそうとしたり、完全合理性の仮定を緩やかにすることで戦争が起きるメカニズムを見いだそうとします。この論文の著者であるJohnsonとTierneyは｢政策決定者が合理的であれば戦争なんて起きない｣という前提の下で、戦争が起きるのは政策決定者が非合理的だからだと考えます。戦争は２国以上が関わった武力衝突です。けんかするぞと言っても相手が応じなければけんかができないように、戦争も１国で起こすことはできません。片方が勝てば、もう片方は負けます。では負けそうな側は最初から相手側の要求に屈服した方が得なのに、なぜ戦争をするのか。JohnsonとTierneyは｢戦争のルビコン理論」なる心理学的説明をもって、平和の初期状態が壊れる理由を明らかにしようとします。
ルビコンとはカエサルが戦争を決意し、後戻りの出来ない決定をしたときに渡った川の名前です。ルビコン川を渡ったときに彼が発した有名な言葉が「賽は投げられた(Alea jacta est)｣です。｢戦争のルビコン理論｣とは、武力衝突の可能性が高まるにつれ、政策決定者は戦争に勝つと確信(confidence)を持ち始めることだそうです。戦争に負けそうな国の政策決定者もoverconfidenceになり、開戦しようとするから戦争が起きるというわけですが、カエサルはルビコン川を渡って英雄になったわけですから、どうも命名がおかしいような気がしてなりません。
“When people believe they have crossed a psychological Rubicon and perceive war to be imminent, they switch from what psychologists call a 'deliberative' to an 'implemental' mind-set, triggering a number of psychological biases, most notably overconfidence. These biases can cause an increase in aggressive or risky military planning. Furthermore, if actors believe that war is imminent when it is not in fact certain to occur, the switch to implemental mind-sets can be a causal factor in the outbreak of war, by raising the perceived probability of military victory and encouraging hawkish and provocative policies.” (p. 7)
この議論は心理学のmindset theoryに依っています。mindset theoryとは後戻りのできない決定をすると、その決定がうまくいく思い込むようになる人の性行について分析する理論のことです。キーワードはdeliberative mind-set, implemental mind-set, overconfidenceの3つです。
“The Rubicon model posits that the decisionmaking process follows a series of distinct stages, each of which activates a particular mind-set, or cognitive orientation. A 'deliberative' mind-set dominates the predecisional phase, when options and possible outcomes are weighed and compared. An 'implemental' mind-set dominates the postdecisional phase, when the focus shifts to carrying out the chosen course of action. Importantly, the shift from a deliberative to an implemental mind-set can occur either when an actor freely chooses a policy from a menu of options, or when a course of action is dictated by an external source: '[W]hat matters is that one feels called upon to implement a certain goal, regardless of whether it is chosen or assigned.' The metaphor of crossing the Rubicon refers to the moment when deliberations have, for whatever reason, been put to rest.” (pp. 13-14)
重要決定をおこなう前のdeliberative mind-setの段階では、人は比較的合理的に判断・行動するが、その決定をすると、情報処理能力が弱まり、それが成功する確率が高いとoverconfidenceするそうです。
“Actors in a deliberative mind-set (left column of table 1) adopt a relatively objective approach to judgment and decisionmaking, weighing the expected utility of different options in an effort to make the best selection. In deliberative mind-sets, people may approximate the rational actor model of decisionmaking.
By contrast, judgment and decisionmaking are very different in an implemental mind-set, which occurs when actors plan how to implement their chosen course of action or actually engage in implementation (right column of table 1). The task now is to prepare for the achievement of certain goals and avoid being distracted by alternatives or doubts. Actors in an implemental mind-set become committed to the course of action that has been chosen or forced on them. They focus intensely on getting the task done and resist reconsidering decisions they have already made or contemplating other courses of action. As Heckhausen and Gollwitzer put it, implemental mind-sets turn people into 'narrow-minded partisans of their plans of action.' People in implemental mind-sets are especially likely to deviate from a rational model of decisionmaking – in six specific dimensions.” (pp. 14-15)
非合理的になるのは次の５つ。
1. receptivity to incoming information
2. processing of incoming information
3. vulnerability to cognitive dissonance
4. vulnerability to self-serving evaluations
5. vulnerability to illusion of control
6. expectations of task
(pp. 15-18)
mind-set theoryに基づいて著者が提示した｢戦争のルビコン理論｣仮説は以下の３つ。
H1: Implemental mind-sets cause overconfidence about war
H2: Increases in overconfidence cause the outbreak of war
H3: Increase in overconfidence cause risky military planning
(pp. 20-24)
要するに、�＼鐐茲�今にも起ころうとしていると認識すると、情報処理が合理的でなくなり、自国が戦争に勝利すると過信する、�∩蠡侘�する国が双方とも過信するので、双方とも合理的であればあり得ない戦争も勃発する、��戦争プランをうまくやり遂げると過信するので、軍事プランも冒険的なものになる、ということです。そして、この仮説の妥当性を検証するためにJohnsonとTierneyは第一次世界大戦の事例を実証分析します。
では論文のコメントです。
�＼鐐茲�避けられないと認識すると、本当に政策決定者は戦争に勝つと｢過信(overconfidence)」し、戦争勃発の可能性が高まるのか?
心理学におけるmindset theoryによると、deliberative mindsetsがimplemental mindsetsに移行すると情報処理能力が著しく落ちるそうです。New York大学のPeter Gollwitzer(http://www.psych.nyu.edu/gollwitzer/)がこの理論の主導者ですが、最近はOhio State U.のKentaro Fujita (http://faculty.psy.ohio-state.edu/fujita/)氏がmindset theoryに関する論文を多数発表しています。興味のある方はまずはこの論文を読んでみてください。http://faculty.psy.ohio-state.edu/fujita/docs/Fujita,%20Gollwitzer,%20&%20Oettingen%20%282007%29.pdf
JohnsonとTierneyは、この心理学的議論をそのまま戦争勃発論に適用できると考えていますが、政策決定者は本当に戦争勃発が近づいていると認識すると、本当に自国が戦争に勝つと思い込むのでしょうか。
mindset theoryがうまく当てはまりそうなのは大学院進学の決定です。大学院に進学して研究者になれる確率は2割以下という情報があったとします。大学生が大学卒業後の進路について考えるときはわりと客観的にこの情報を受け取り、大学院進学のリスクを他の選択肢と比較して測ることが出来ますが、いったん大学院に進学すると多数の院生は自分の将来は大丈夫だろうとoverconfidenceします。Richard Ned Lebowが彼の著作のどこかで、人間は非合理的であるエピソードの1つとして大学院に行くという決定をあげていましたが、たしかに将来のリスクを真剣に考えた上で院に進学する人ってあまりいないような気がします。
でも、戦争が起きそうだと認識したら、つねにoverconfidenceするようにも思えません。そんなのが本当であれば危機管理なんていつも失敗するでしょう。例えば、1962年のキューバ危機でケネディ政権とフルシチョフ政権がともに自分らの方がうまくいくと過信していたら、あのような形で危機が収束することはなかったでしょう。
おそらくdeliberative mindsetsがimplemental mindsetsに移行するとoverconfidenceするというmindset theory仮説はかなり正しいと思いますが、それが戦争理論に適用できるのは、政策決定者がwar is immindentと認識したときではなく、we must win the warという｢目的｣を設定したときだと思います。「戦争に勝たねばならぬ」と言うのであれば悲観論者の山本五十六でさえ、戦争に本当に勝てるだろうかなんていちいち考えずに、戦争に勝つための｢手段｣を見つけることだけに専念します。患者に｢この手術が成功する確率は10%以下です。それでも手術しますか?」と尋ねる外科医もいざ手術となったら、100%成功すると信じて手術をするでしょう。目的が決まったら、その目的を追求するアクターはそれがうまくいく確率なんて深く考えようとはしないものです。cost-benefit analysisの対象となるのはつねに｢目的｣ではなく、｢手段｣だからです。
でも現代の相互依存と核時代の国際社会では、戦争の勝者になったも経済的・社会的コストが甚大なものとなります。そうだとすると「戦争が近い」という認識は何が何でも戦争を回避しないといけないという｢目的｣設定を生み出すかもしれません。そこでmindset theoryに従って戦争は回避できるというoverconfidenceが生まれるかもしれませんが、その場合、JohnsonとTierneyが予測するような戦争勃発という結果を生み出しません。どうも｢戦争のルビコン理論｣は眉唾的なものに見えてしまいます。
��第一次世界大戦の事例分析。｢戦争のルビコン理論｣の妥当性を検証するためにWWIを事例分析する理由を24ページで長々と説明していますが、単一事例分析はいくら正当化しようとしても科学的実証にはなじまないんだから、plausibility probingをする場合は、1つの事例を詳細に分析するのではなく、Robert JervisがPerception and Misperception in International Politics (1976)でやったように逸話的な事例を多数紹介する方がよっぽといいと思います。WWI事例分析のところは本当に読んでつまらなかったです。
とぶつぶつ小言を並べましたが、個人的には非常に面白い論文と思いました。政策決定者が合理的である限り戦争は起きないと考え、アクターのrationalityを仮定せずに、アクターがnonrationalになる状況を見つけることで戦争原因の理由を発見しようとするのは戦争研究の1つの立場として非常に有力だと思います。
Dominic D.P. Johnson (U. of Edinburgh) and Dominic Tierney (Swarthmore College), “The Rubicon Theory of War: How the Path to Conflict Reaches the Point of No Return,” International Security, 36:1 (Summer 2011), pp. 7-40.
International Security最新号の巻頭論文です。タダで読むことができるので興味のある方は次をクリック★ http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00043
なぜ戦争は起こるの? 子供にこう尋ねられて、うまく返答できる国際政治学者は実はそんなにはいないと思います。平和な世界のdefault positionが異なるからです。子供にとっての初期状態は他人に迷惑をかけない善人ばかりいる世界です。その初期状態を変えるのは悪い人たちです。自分の得のために平気で他人を不幸に陥れる人がいるから戦争は起きるに違いないと子どもたちは考え、そういう人が世の中にはいるのが信じられないから戦争が起きるのが不思議でしょうがなくなるわけです。ニンテンドー3DSを買ってもらっただけでこの世の至福を味わえる子どもたちには、ゲーム機を得るために人を殺すなんて本当に信じられないことなのです。だから子どもたちには、世の中には自分のことしか考えないとっても悪い人がいるってことを教えてあげたうえで、そういう一部の邪悪な人間がどんな得を得ようとして戦争を起こすのか説明しないといけません（http://www.systemicsarchive.com/ja/c/war.html参照。その一昔前のマルクス主義的議論がけっこう笑えます）。
国際政治学者にとってのdefault positionはindividual rationalityです。戦争を起こすことで得をする人がいるから戦争が起きる、という発想を（主流の）国際政治学者はしません。得をするためには戦争に勝たないといけませんが、政策決定者が合理的であったら、負ける側は戦争に訴えずに最初から相手側の要求を受け入れた方が得なはずです。だったら実際に武力が行使される前に交渉・バーゲニングで双方の対立は解決されるわけです。政策決定者が完全合理性を有していたら戦争は起きないというのが国際政治学における初期状態であり、その初期状態を壊すものを見いだすことで彼らは戦争の原因が何か発見しようとします（もちろん、違った観点から戦争原因を探る研究は多々ありますが、戦争を原初状態と見なすよりも、戦争のない世界を常態と見なした方がなにかとわかりやすくなると思います）。
合理主義者はこの問題に対して｢合理性の非合理性｣を見いだそうとしたり、完全合理性の仮定を緩やかにすることで戦争が起きるメカニズムを見いだそうとします。この論文の著者であるJohnsonとTierneyは｢政策決定者が合理的であれば戦争なんて起きない｣という前提の下で、戦争が起きるのは政策決定者が非合理的だからだと考えます。戦争は２国以上が関わった武力衝突です。けんかするぞと言っても相手が応じなければけんかができないように、戦争も１国で起こすことはできません。片方が勝てば、もう片方は負けます。では負けそうな側は最初から相手側の要求に屈服した方が得なのに、なぜ戦争をするのか。JohnsonとTierneyは｢戦争のルビコン理論」なる心理学的説明をもって、平和の初期状態が壊れる理由を明らかにしようとします。
ルビコンとはカエサルが戦争を決意し、後戻りの出来ない決定をしたときに渡った川の名前です。ルビコン川を渡ったときに彼が発した有名な言葉が「賽は投げられた(Alea jacta est)｣です。｢戦争のルビコン理論｣とは、武力衝突の可能性が高まるにつれ、政策決定者は戦争に勝つと確信(confidence)を持ち始めることだそうです。戦争に負けそうな国の政策決定者もoverconfidenceになり、開戦しようとするから戦争が起きるというわけですが、カエサルはルビコン川を渡って英雄になったわけですから、どうも命名がおかしいような気がしてなりません。
“When people believe they have crossed a psychological Rubicon and perceive war to be imminent, they switch from what psychologists call a 'deliberative' to an 'implemental' mind-set, triggering a number of psychological biases, most notably overconfidence. These biases can cause an increase in aggressive or risky military planning. Furthermore, if actors believe that war is imminent when it is not in fact certain to occur, the switch to implemental mind-sets can be a causal factor in the outbreak of war, by raising the perceived probability of military victory and encouraging hawkish and provocative policies.” (p. 7)
この議論は心理学のmindset theoryに依っています。mindset theoryとは後戻りのできない決定をすると、その決定がうまくいく思い込むようになる人の性行について分析する理論のことです。キーワードはdeliberative mind-set, implemental mind-set, overconfidenceの3つです。
“The Rubicon model posits that the decisionmaking process follows a series of distinct stages, each of which activates a particular mind-set, or cognitive orientation. A 'deliberative' mind-set dominates the predecisional phase, when options and possible outcomes are weighed and compared. An 'implemental' mind-set dominates the postdecisional phase, when the focus shifts to carrying out the chosen course of action. Importantly, the shift from a deliberative to an implemental mind-set can occur either when an actor freely chooses a policy from a menu of options, or when a course of action is dictated by an external source: '[W]hat matters is that one feels called upon to implement a certain goal, regardless of whether it is chosen or assigned.' The metaphor of crossing the Rubicon refers to the moment when deliberations have, for whatever reason, been put to rest.” (pp. 13-14)
重要決定をおこなう前のdeliberative mind-setの段階では、人は比較的合理的に判断・行動するが、その決定をすると、情報処理能力が弱まり、それが成功する確率が高いとoverconfidenceするそうです。
“Actors in a deliberative mind-set (left column of table 1) adopt a relatively objective approach to judgment and decisionmaking, weighing the expected utility of different options in an effort to make the best selection. In deliberative mind-sets, people may approximate the rational actor model of decisionmaking.
By contrast, judgment and decisionmaking are very different in an implemental mind-set, which occurs when actors plan how to implement their chosen course of action or actually engage in implementation (right column of table 1). The task now is to prepare for the achievement of certain goals and avoid being distracted by alternatives or doubts. Actors in an implemental mind-set become committed to the course of action that has been chosen or forced on them. They focus intensely on getting the task done and resist reconsidering decisions they have already made or contemplating other courses of action. As Heckhausen and Gollwitzer put it, implemental mind-sets turn people into 'narrow-minded partisans of their plans of action.' People in implemental mind-sets are especially likely to deviate from a rational model of decisionmaking – in six specific dimensions.” (pp. 14-15)
非合理的になるのは次の５つ。
1. receptivity to incoming information
2. processing of incoming information
3. vulnerability to cognitive dissonance
4. vulnerability to self-serving evaluations
5. vulnerability to illusion of control
6. expectations of task
(pp. 15-18)
mind-set theoryに基づいて著者が提示した｢戦争のルビコン理論｣仮説は以下の３つ。
H1: Implemental mind-sets cause overconfidence about war
H2: Increases in overconfidence cause the outbreak of war
H3: Increase in overconfidence cause risky military planning
(pp. 20-24)
要するに、�＼鐐茲�今にも起ころうとしていると認識すると、情報処理が合理的でなくなり、自国が戦争に勝利すると過信する、�∩蠡侘�する国が双方とも過信するので、双方とも合理的であればあり得ない戦争も勃発する、��戦争プランをうまくやり遂げると過信するので、軍事プランも冒険的なものになる、ということです。そして、この仮説の妥当性を検証するためにJohnsonとTierneyは第一次世界大戦の事例を実証分析します。
では論文のコメントです。
�＼鐐茲�避けられないと認識すると、本当に政策決定者は戦争に勝つと｢過信(overconfidence)」し、戦争勃発の可能性が高まるのか?
心理学におけるmindset theoryによると、deliberative mindsetsがimplemental mindsetsに移行すると情報処理能力が著しく落ちるそうです。New York大学のPeter Gollwitzer(http://www.psych.nyu.edu/gollwitzer/)がこの理論の主導者ですが、最近はOhio State U.のKentaro Fujita (http://faculty.psy.ohio-state.edu/fujita/)氏がmindset theoryに関する論文を多数発表しています。興味のある方はまずはこの論文を読んでみてください。http://faculty.psy.ohio-state.edu/fujita/docs/Fujita,%20Gollwitzer,%20&%20Oettingen%20%282007%29.pdf
JohnsonとTierneyは、この心理学的議論をそのまま戦争勃発論に適用できると考えていますが、政策決定者は本当に戦争勃発が近づいていると認識すると、本当に自国が戦争に勝つと思い込むのでしょうか。
mindset theoryがうまく当てはまりそうなのは大学院進学の決定です。大学院に進学して研究者になれる確率は2割以下という情報があったとします。大学生が大学卒業後の進路について考えるときはわりと客観的にこの情報を受け取り、大学院進学のリスクを他の選択肢と比較して測ることが出来ますが、いったん大学院に進学すると多数の院生は自分の将来は大丈夫だろうとoverconfidenceします。Richard Ned Lebowが彼の著作のどこかで、人間は非合理的であるエピソードの1つとして大学院に行くという決定をあげていましたが、たしかに将来のリスクを真剣に考えた上で院に進学する人ってあまりいないような気がします。
でも、戦争が起きそうだと認識したら、つねにoverconfidenceするようにも思えません。そんなのが本当であれば危機管理なんていつも失敗するでしょう。例えば、1962年のキューバ危機でケネディ政権とフルシチョフ政権がともに自分らの方がうまくいくと過信していたら、あのような形で危機が収束することはなかったでしょう。
おそらくdeliberative mindsetsがimplemental mindsetsに移行するとoverconfidenceするというmindset theory仮説はかなり正しいと思いますが、それが戦争理論に適用できるのは、政策決定者がwar is immindentと認識したときではなく、we must win the warという｢目的｣を設定したときだと思います。「戦争に勝たねばならぬ」と言うのであれば悲観論者の山本五十六でさえ、戦争に本当に勝てるだろうかなんていちいち考えずに、戦争に勝つための｢手段｣を見つけることだけに専念します。患者に｢この手術が成功する確率は10%以下です。それでも手術しますか?」と尋ねる外科医もいざ手術となったら、100%成功すると信じて手術をするでしょう。目的が決まったら、その目的を追求するアクターはそれがうまくいく確率なんて深く考えようとはしないものです。cost-benefit analysisの対象となるのはつねに｢目的｣ではなく、｢手段｣だからです。
でも現代の相互依存と核時代の国際社会では、戦争の勝者になったも経済的・社会的コストが甚大なものとなります。そうだとすると「戦争が近い」という認識は何が何でも戦争を回避しないといけないという｢目的｣設定を生み出すかもしれません。そこでmindset theoryに従って戦争は回避できるというoverconfidenceが生まれるかもしれませんが、その場合、JohnsonとTierneyが予測するような戦争勃発という結果を生み出しません。どうも｢戦争のルビコン理論｣は眉唾的なものに見えてしまいます。
��第一次世界大戦の事例分析。｢戦争のルビコン理論｣の妥当性を検証するためにWWIを事例分析する理由を24ページで長々と説明していますが、単一事例分析はいくら正当化しようとしても科学的実証にはなじまないんだから、plausibility probingをする場合は、1つの事例を詳細に分析するのではなく、Robert JervisがPerception and Misperception in International Politics (1976)でやったように逸話的な事例を多数紹介する方がよっぽといいと思います。WWI事例分析のところは本当に読んでつまらなかったです。
とぶつぶつ小言を並べましたが、個人的には非常に面白い論文と思いました。政策決定者が合理的である限り戦争は起きないと考え、アクターのrationalityを仮定せずに、アクターがnonrationalになる状況を見つけることで戦争原因の理由を発見しようとするのは戦争研究の1つの立場として非常に有力だと思います。
投稿原稿の書き換え?
｢戦略研究学会｣というなんか怪しそうな名前の学会ですごい事件が起きたんですね。「投稿原稿書き換え」があったと聞いたから、てっきり投稿者がアクセプトされた後に原稿の内容をこっそり書き直したんだと思ったら、なんと編集責任者だった防衛研究所の石津朋之という人が、東京電機大学の中島浩貴氏と九州工業大学の永松聡氏に命じて、投稿済みの原稿内容を勝手に書き換えさせたらしいです。命じる方も命じる方ですが（石津氏は学会から追い出されたみたい）、上の人間の命令をそのまま聞いて不正行為に荷担するのもかなり情けないですね（中島氏と永松氏は理事を辞任しただけらしい）。戦略論とか地政学とかしょうもない研究ばっかりやっているとどうもモラルがどんどん欠けてくるみたいなようで(-__-)